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Abstract
Consistent with facts for a cross-section of OECD countries, I docu-
ment that the labor force participation rate of West German mothers
with children aged zero to two exceeds the corresponding child care
enrollment rate whereas the opposite is true for mothers with children
aged three to mandatory school age. I develop a life-cycle model that
explicitly accounts for this age-dependent relationship through various
types of non-paid and paid child care. The calibrated version of the
model is used to evaluate two recently passed policy reforms concern-
ing the supply of subsidized child care for children aged zero to two
in Germany. These counterfactual policy experiments suggest that the
lack of subsidized child care constitutes indeed for some females a bar-
rier to participate in the labor market and depresses fertility.
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1 Introduction
At the Barcelona meeting in March 2002, the European Council recom-
mended that its member states remove “barriers and disincentives for female
labor force participation by, inter alia, improving the provision of child care
facilities”, European Council (2002). Even quantitative targets for the level
of provision were set. By 2010, the EU member states shall provide child
care for 33% of all children younger than age three and for 90% of all chil-
dren aged three to mandatory school age. In 2008, the German government
passed a law that aims at implementing the target value for children younger
than age three. In a dossier accompanying the actual bill, the German Fed-
eral Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth further
motivated this target value by recognizing that for women “good conditions
for the compatibility of family and working life are a prerequisite to fulfill
their desired fertility level” and by “the exemplary standards in Western and
Northern European countries, for which a relationship between child care
enrollment, maternal employment and fertility is observed”, see Sharma and
Steiner (2008). Governments may provide child care and promote female la-
bor force participation and fertility for several reasons, e.g. investment in
children’s human capital, gender equality or to alleviate the economic conse-
quences of the demographic change for the labor market and social security
system. In this paper I am after a more basic question, namely to quantify
in how far (not) providing child care constitutes a barrier or disincentive for
female labor force participation and fertility choices.
Figure 1 shows for a cross-section of EU countries (those which are also in
the OECD) the significant positive correlation of the enrollment rate in paid
child care of children aged zero to two with both, the labor force participa-
tion rate of mothers with children aged zero to two and the total fertility
rate.1 However, these correlations do not necessarily reflect causality, in
particular because due to data availability only the actual enrollment rates
and not the provision rates are displayed. Hence, these figures do not permit
to draw conclusions on how far (not) providing child care constitutes a bar-
rier or disincentive for female labor force participation and fertility choices.
Moreover, the relationships crucially hinge on the age of the children. For
children aged three to five the previously significant positive correlations be-
come negative or much weaker and are no longer statistically significant, see
Figure 2. This suggests a very different role of child care for maternal labor
force participation decisions in the two age groups. In this context, Figures
1In OECD (2007) the enrollment rates for children aged zero to two concern formal
child care arrangements such as group care in child care centers, registered child minders
based in their homes looking after one or more children, and care provided by a carer at
the home of the child. For children aged three to five enrollment rates concern formal
pre-school services including daycare facilities and in some countries primary schooling.
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Figure 1: Child Care Enrollment of Children Aged 0 to 2 in the EU
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Figure 2: Child Care Enrollment of Children Aged 3 to 5 in the EU
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1 and 2 reveal another important relationship. The labor force participation
rate of mothers with children aged zero to two exceeds the corresponding
child care enrollment rate on average by 29 percentage points. To the con-
trary, for mother with children aged three to five the child care enrollment
exceeds the maternal labor force participation rate on average by 19 percent-
age points. Put differently, paid child care is used heavily by non-working
mothers (of children between age three and five) whereas a substantial frac-
tion of mothers (of children below age three) works without using any paid
child care. It is worthwhile to mention that this latter fact is also true for the
US and Canada where 18.5 and 39.7 percentage points more of the mothers
with children aged zero to two are working than using paid child care, see
OECD (2007).
The major contribution of this paper is to analyze the role of child care for
maternal labor force participation and fertility decisions taking into account
the age-dependent relationships between the variables of interest through
various types of child care. I set up a quantitative, dynamic life-cycle model
with labor force participation and fertility choices and distinguish between
maternal time, paid child care provided in public (subsidized) and market
(non-subsidized) arrangements as well as non-paid child care (e.g. grandpar-
ents). This contrasts to a number of recent papers using static or dynamic
quantitative models to analyze the impact of child care (e.g. Wrohlich, 2006;
Attanasio et al., 2008; Haan and Wrohlich, 2009; Domeij and Klein, 2010)
which apart from Haan and Wrohlich (2009) treat fertility as exogenous and,
except Wrohlich (2006), require mothers to buy one hour of paid child care
for each hour worked. This latter assumption is clearly at odds with the
facts for children aged zero to two, compare Figure 1.2
I calibrate the model for a sample of West German married females.3 West
Germany is an ideal candidate for the analysis for two reasons. First in terms
of data availability, the German Socioeconomic Panel is the only European
household panel with continuous information on paid child care usage along
the extensive and intensive (part- vs. full-time) margin. Moreover, the char-
acteristics of the German child care market permit to infer whether a child
attends market (non-subsidized) or publicly (subsidized) provided child care.
2Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) list further studies with a focus on child care and
maternal labor force participation which as well, including Kornstad and Thoresen (2007),
do not incorporate a fertility choice. A subset of these papers relaxes the strict link between
paid child care and maternal labor force participation. Del Boca (2002), and Del Boca and
Sauer (2009) constitute a special case. They investigate the impact of child care provision
as an “economy-wide factor” on fertility and maternal labor force participation without
modeling child care as a choice or as a requirement for working mothers.
3I restrict the analysis to West Germany since, originating from the pre-reunification
period, maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment rates differ even today
strongly between West and East Germany. In a companion paper (Bick, 2010) I document
these differences in detail and analyze them with the model presented here.
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In addition, the number of subsidized child care slots per hundred children
is available from the German Statistical Office. Second, the low maternal la-
bor force participation, child care enrollment and fertility rates in Germany
are representative for Continental Europe (with the exception of France and
BeNeLux), such that the results from counterfactual policy experiments
should be of interest to other Continental European countries.
I evaluate for Germany a recently passed law which becomes effective in
October 2010 and aims at implementing the target for the provision of child
care for children aged zero to two set by the European Council at the 2002
Barcelona meeting. Under this reform all working females are granted access
to subsidized child care. According to my results the lack of subsidized child
care constitutes indeed for some females a barrier to participate in the labor
market and depresses fertility. The predicted increase of the labor force
participation rate is 23% (7.4 percentage points) for mothers with children
aged zero to two and the fertility rate increases by 3% (0.05 children per
female). The implied child care enrollment rate is 41% and thus relatively
close to the targeted level of 33%. I consider a further law that has already
been passed but will not become effective until 2013. It is a natural extension
of the previous reform and grants access to subsidized part-time child care
for all children aged zero to two, i.e. unconditional on the maternal labor
force status. This reform results in a higher child care enrollment rate but
has neither an impact on maternal labor force participation nor on fertility
relative to the first reform. Hence, only females that are constrained in
their labor force participation choice by the lack of subsidized child care are
also constrained in their fertility choice. Summing up, the results suggest
that at least for married females the importance of child care is too low
to explain the maternal labor force participation and fertility differences
between Germany or Continental Europe and the Western and Northern
European countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, I describe the data set,
and how the sample is selected and constructed. Section 3 documents facts
about maternal labor force participation, child care usage and the supply of
subsidized child care in West Germany. I introduce the model in Section 4
and discuss the calibration in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 presents the results
from a set of counterfactual policy experiments and Section 8 concludes.
2 Data
The analysis in this paper is based on the German Socioeconomic Panel
(GSOEP), an annual household panel comparable in scope to the American
4
PSID.4 The GSOEP provides all information required for the pursued ques-
tion, i.e. female cohabitation, labor force participation and birth histories,
child care enrollment choices, paid child care fees, and income. In particu-
lar, it is the only European household panel with information on paid child
care usage along the extensive and intensive (part- vs. full-time) margin over
the entire sample period.5 The data are drawn from the first wave in 1984
through 2007 spanning the years 1983 to 2006 since the variables on labor
force participation and income refer to the year prior to each interview.
Following the common practice in the literature on female labor supply
and fertility, only females living in a continuous relationship (marriage or
cohabitation) with the same partner are included in the sample.6 I include
only the most recent relationship but require that it is still intact at the
last interview and that all children (if present) are from the current partner.
The analysis focuses entirely on West German females and consequently
only females that lived there throughout the whole observation period are
considered. Finally, given a trade-off between sample size and potential
cohort effects females born between 1955 and 1975 are included. The number
of individuals satisfying the respective selection criteria are shown in Table
A.1 in Appendix A.1.
Figure 3: A Child’s Life from Birth to Adulthood
Pre-school School
Age
Period
0 3 6.5 9.5 12.5 15.5 18.5
1 2 3 4 5 6
Maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment choices by the
children’s age constitute the core of the analysis in this paper. Similarly
to Apps and Rees (2005), my focus is however not on the maternal labor
force participation status in each month of a child’s life but during the
different stages of a child’s adolescence. For pre-school ages I follow the usual
convention and split them up in two periods, ages zero to two and ages three
to mandatory school age where children in Germany are on average six and
a half years old. To keep the periods at a similar length, the subsequent age
brackets cover three years until adulthood is reached. Figure 3 summarizes
4A detailed description of the GSOEP can be found in Wagner et al. (2007).
5The European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) also has detailed
information on child care usage but started only in 2004.
6The implied selection bias of focussing on this group of females may go in opposite
directions. For example, the unobservables that produce long-term relationships could
make women more desirable in the labor market (e.g., good communication and conflict
management skills) but could also reflect preferences for non-market activities as household
production. A more detailed discussion can be found in Francesconi (2002).
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Table 1: Observations
Current Nr. of Children
Age Youngest Child 1 2 3 4+
< 3 400 458 126 39
< 6.5 186 332 99 27
< 9.5 131 274 85 30
< 12.5 111 212 59 15
< 15.5 86 129 38 8
< 18.5 64 106 22 8
Note: To avoid biased means if there are trends in labor partici-
pation or child care enrollment within a period, i.e. during a stage
of a child’s adolescence, only periods that are neither interrupted
by another birth nor left or right censored through the first or last
interview are included.
this mapping. Table 1 presents the final number of observations for each
period grouped by the current number of children, e.g. the sample contains
458 females with currently two children and the youngest child being younger
than three. Given the low number of observations for females with currently
four and more children, the analysis on maternal labor force participation
and child care enrollment in this paper focuses on females with one to three
children only.
For each period the female labor supply is constructed similar to Francesconi
(2002): I assign 0 to each month in which the female does not work, 0.5 to
each month in which she works part-time and 1 to each month in which she
works full-time.7 The period labor force participation status is then defined
by the mean over all months. Period means below 0.25 correspond to not
working, between 0.25 and 0.75 to part-time working, and above 0.75 to
full-time working. As an implication, a female working part-time in each
month of a period and one not working in the first half of a period but
full-time in the second half have the same period labor force participation
status, namely part-time working. In line with the objective of this paper
this definition reflects how much a female has worked in total during certain
stages of her children’s adolescence.
The GSOEP asks for enrollment in two different categories of child care,
7The monthly labor force participation status is based on the retrospective informa-
tion for the year prior to each interview. For the classification of part- and full-time
work in each month I follow the convention outlined in the GSOEP documentation
(http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/60055/pgen.pdf).
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namely daycare centers and nannies, and whether the child is enrolled part-
(during the morning or afternoon) or full-time (all day). Since virtually
every daycare centers receive public subsidies I use this category for pub-
licly provided child care, henceforth called subsidized child care. During
the observation period parents could claim only in special circumstances,
e.g. severe diseases, financial support for hiring a nanny reflecting that nan-
nies rather constitute a market arrangement. Accordingly, I label them as
non-subsidized child care. The corresponding period enrollment status for
subsidized and non-subsidized child care is then calculated in the same way
as the labor force participation status.8 Finally, aggregate statistics on the
provision of subsidized part- and full-time child care by age groups (zero to
two and three to six and a half) are available from the Germans Statistical
Office.9
3 Stylized Facts
This section documents labor force participation and child care enrollment
choices for the selected sample of West German married females.10 These
facts will be either used as calibration targets for the model developed in
Section 4 or for the evaluation of the model by providing a set of overi-
dentifying restrictions. I further describe features of the German child care
market, namely the provision of subsidized child care as well as the parental
fees for subsidized and non-subsidized child care, that can be considered as
exogenous for the individual choices and will serve as model inputs.
I start with the discussion of the total maternal labor force participation and
child care enrollment rates and will turn to the part- and full-time differences
further below.
3.1 Maternal Labor Force Participation and Child Care
Figure 4 shows that the maternal labor force participation rate increases
with the youngest child’s age but at a strongly decreasing rate. In particular,
8The child care enrollment status is only known for the interview month. The impu-
tation for the remaining months and how I deal with changes in the GSOEP child care
questions over time is described in Appendix A.2.
9In Appendix A.3 I describe how I calculate the period provision rates of subsidized
child care such that they are consistent with the definition of the period labor force
participation and child care enrollment status as discussed before.
10Since the fraction of females with one, two and three children varies by the youngest
child’s age, see Table 1, I weight the corresponding labor force participation and child care
enrollment rates by the fraction of females in the sample with one, two and three children
(conditional on having children) which are given in Table 3. This adjustment has only a
small quantitative but no qualitative impact on the presented facts.
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the major increase happens during pre-school ages (from 31% to 61%) and
at school entry (from 61% to 73%). The subsequent increases are far smaller
and when the youngest child turns adult (ages 16 to 18.5) 80% of the mothers
in the sample are working.
The increase of the child care enrollment rate, comprising subsidized and
non-subsidized child care, from 6% for children aged zero to two to 95% for
children aged three to six and a half is much larger than the corresponding
increase in the maternal labor force participation rate. Accordingly, the
selected sample displays a similar relationship as the cross-section of EU
countries shown in Figures 1 and 2: the maternal labor force participation
rate for the age group zero to two is much larger than the enrollment rate
in paid child care (31% vs. 6%), whereas the opposite is true for the age
group three to six and a half (61% vs. 95%). Table 2 takes a closer look
at this relationship. Only 13.7% of the working mothers whose youngest
child is of age zero to two use paid child care. Given the age of the children
the remaining 86.3% of the working mothers necessarily use some form of
non-paid child care to free up the time to work. Although 95% of the
husbands are working full-time, they could still take care of the children if the
females work at another time of the day than their husbands. Grandparents,
other family members or friends might also take care of the children at no
monetary costs. Since the total enrollment rate in paid child care is 95% for
children aged three to six and a half, it is not surprising that the respective
conditional child care enrollment rates hardly vary with the maternal labor
force participation status.
Overall, the correlation between the maternal labor force participation and
child care enrollment rate is weak whereas the correlation of both variables,
particularly the child care enrollment rate, with the children’s age is large.
In fact as can be seen in Figure 4, the child care enrollment rate matches up
perfectly with the provision rate of subsidized child care: 6.2% vs. 6.1% for
children aged zero to two, and 95.4% vs. 95.6% for children aged three to
six and a half. A key question is whether this concurrence is an equilibrium
outcome in the sense that the demand for and supply of subsidized child care
equal each other. Several arguments speak against that conjecture. First,
the fees for subsidized child care are highly regulated and are rather set
by the (local) administration than adjusting freely. Second, throughout the
1960’s and 1970’s political initiatives lead to a huge expansion of subsidized
child care facilities with the aim to provide affordable, high quality pre-
school education for children from age three onwards, see Kreyenfeld et al.
(2002), which explains the extremely low (high) provision rates for children
aged zero to two (three to six and a half). Only in recent years the political
focus has shifted to the view of child care also as a means to enable mothers
to work. Furthermore, the experience from the actual implementation of
legislative changes on the provision of subsidized child care during the mid
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Figure 4: Maternal Labor Force Participation
and Child Care
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Table 2: Child Care Enrollment Rate
Conditional on Maternal Labor Force Participation Status
Ages
0 to 2 3 to 6.5
At least part-time care
Not Working 2.9 93.2
Working 13.7 96.7
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Figure 5: Maternal Labor Force Participation
and Child Care: Part- vs. Full-time
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1990’s strongly suggests that the supply of subsidized child care slots adjusts
only very slowly and is rather fixed in the short run, see Kreyenfeld et al.
(2002) and Kolvenbach et al. (2004). Third, given the lack of aggregate
statistics on the demand for subsidized child care, Wrohlich (2008) estimates
the excess demand for subsidized child care to be close to zero for children
from age three onwards but far above zero for the younger age group. In line
with these estimates, the fraction of children enrolled in non-subsidized child
care in the sample, either exclusively or in addition to subsidized child care,
conditional on being enrolled in child care is only 0.8% for the age group
three to six and a half but 40.4% for the age group zero to two. Assuming
that the only distinctions between subsidized and non-subsidized child care
are the availability (rationed vs. non-rationed) and the parental fees (non-
subsidized child care is three to four times as expensive as subsidized child
care, see Table C.6 in Appendix C.3) at least qualitatively this outcome
could have been expected.
3.2 Part- vs. Full-time
Another important feature of the data is the prevalence of part-time ma-
ternal labor force participation, child care enrollment and subsidized child
care provision, see Figure 5. The profile of the total maternal labor force
participation rate follows the profile of the part-time maternal labor force
participation rate until age nine and a half, while the increase afterwards
mainly stems from the full-time labor force participation rate. Although the
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full-time child care enrollment for children aged three to six and a half is
above the corresponding full-time maternal labor force participation rate,
the usage of non-paid child care is still pervasive among full-time working
mothers in this age group. Only 32.4% of them actually use full-time child
care. About three fourth of the subsidized child care slots are part-time
with the actual enrollment rater in part-time child care being even higher
because some full-time slots are only use part-time.11
3.3 Summary Key Facts
The facts documented in this section about labor force participation of mar-
ried females with children and their child care enrollment decisions can be
summarized as follows:
1. The maternal labor force participation rate grows as the children age
but at a strongly decreasing rate.
2. Many non-working females use paid child care and many working fe-
males do not use paid child care.
3. Enrollment rates in child care match up with the provision rates of
subsidized child care. Non-subsidized child care is only important for
children aged zero to two.
4. While subsidized child care is three to four times as cheap as non-
subsidized child care, it is only provided for very few children aged
zero to two. Although for nearly all children aged three to six and a
half a subsidized child care slot is available, the majority of those slots
is only part-time.
5. For both, child care enrollment and maternal labor force participation,
the part-time rates exceed the full-time rates.
In the next section, I develop a life-cycle model to explain the set of presented
facts on maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment taken
as given the fixed supply of subsidized child care slots and parental fees for
subsidized and non-subsidized child care.
11Note that these facts are neither an artifact of distinguishing only by part- and full-
time labor force participation nor of the aggregation of the monthly to the period statuses.
The documented patterns also hold qualitatively if one considers hours worked which are
however only available at the interview months. In particular, the results are not driven
by mothers working very few hours. Conditional on working, only 15.6% (10.6%) of those
whose youngest child is of age zero to two (three to six and a half) are working less than
10 hours. The detailed results are available upon request.
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4 The Model
This section introduces a stylized life-cycle model for married females fea-
turing fertility, labor force participation and child care choices.
4.1 Demographics
A female lives for six periods, each of three year length, reflecting the dis-
tinctive stages of a child’s adolescence, as shown in Figure 3.12 At the begin-
ning of her life she is exogenously matched with a man and then chooses how
many children to have. Both the husband and the children stay with her
throughout her whole life. If a female chooses to have more than one child,
all children are born as multiples. This simplifying assumption is made for
tractability.
4.2 Endowments
Females and their husbands are indexed by income shocks ǫ and ǫ∗ which
determine the stochastic component of their market incomes. Asterisks refer
to parameters for the husband. Both spouses are assigned initial income
shocks (ǫ1, ǫ
∗
1) in period one which subsequently evolve stochastically over
time according to an AR(1) process:
ǫt = ρǫt−1 + εt with εt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε )
ǫ∗t = ρ
∗ǫ∗t−1 + ε
∗
t with ε
∗
t ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε∗)
(1)
In the first two periods while children are not yet in school, females can enroll
them in subsidized and/or non-subsidized child care. Both types of child
care are perfect substitutes with the exception of the price and availability.
In contrast to non-subsidized child care, I assume that access to subsidized
child care slots, denoted as at, is rationed and randomly assigned to mothers
by a lottery with age-dependent success probabilities.13
4.3 Preferences
The female is assumed to be the household’s sole decision maker, i.e. she has
the full bargaining power. Her per-period utility function consists of four
additive parts reflecting the utility from her share of consumption (ψ(n)ct),
12For period two the overlap is not exact since the mean duration in the data is three
and a half years.
13I assume that these success probabilities are independent of the maternal labor force
participation status or number of children as their is no information in the data that would
allow me to identify such dependencies.
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her leisure (1 − lt − mt), the number of children (n) less a fixed cost ζ of
having children and a child-related quality measure (Qt):
ut =
(ψ(n)ct)
1−γ0 − 1
1− γ0
+ δ1
(1− lt −mt)
1−γ1 − 1
1− γ1
+ δ2
(1 + n)1−γ2 − 1
1− γ2
− I{n>0}ζ + I{n>0}Qt.
(2)
Obviously, the fixed cost of having children and child quality matter only if
a female has children in which case the indicator function I{n>0} takes the
value one and zero otherwise. With the exception of the fixed cost (ζ) the
specification of the utility function is relatively standard, see e.g. Greenwood
et al. (2003) or Jones et al. (Forthcoming). Household consumption (ct) is
transformed into the consumption realized by an adult, the female’s share,
using the OECD equivalence scale (Oxford scale):
ψ(n) =
1
1.7 + 0.5n
. (3)
A female’s leisure time is the normalized time endowment of one unit of
non-sleeping time reduced by her labor supply (lt) and the time she spends
with her children (mt). The fixed cost (ζ) of having children only affects
the n = 0 vs. n = 1 choice but not any other decision conditional on having
children. It counteracts the large utility gain females receive from having
the first child through the direct utility derived from children (δ2, γ2) and
through Qt.
14 The latter introduces the main behavioral trade-offs with the
concrete specification being motivated by the facts outlined in Section 3. I
deviate from previous formulations used in the literature, as this paper is
the first attempt to explain the joint labor force participation and child care
usage decisions of females within this class of models. Qt gives the utility
that a mother receives from spending time with her children (mt) less the
utility cost of using non-paid child care (ccnp,t), i.e. time neither spend with
the mother nor in subsidized (ccs,t) or non-subsidized (ccns,t) child care:
Qt =δ3ξ(t)m
γ3
t − φ(t)cc
φ2
np,t
=δ3ξ(t)m
γ3
t − φ(t) (1−mt − ccs,t − ccns,t)
φ2 .
(4)
It is important to mention that it is out of the scope of this paper to investi-
gate the impact of the different sources of maternal and non-maternal child
care on children’s human capital and that the employed specification of Qt
should not be interpreted in this direction.
14Some sort of fixed costs of having children are crucial for inducing some females to
not get any children. I also have setup and calibrated a model with a fixed time cost of
having children instead of a pure fixed cost. This model was however not able to explain
the labor force participation behavior of mothers because of the relatively large fixed time
cost needed to match the fraction of females without children.
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Spending time with her children increases the mother’s utility directly be-
cause she enjoys doing so and indirectly via a reduction of ccnp,t. The
utility cost of using non-paid child care reflects e.g. the effort to organize
care provided by grandparents, other family members or friends, the fore-
gone joint leisure-time with the husband if he takes care of the children or
the disutility of taking care of the children while working from home (e.g. as
self-employed). Still, these costs can be avoided by using paid child care in-
stead which however reduces the available resources for consumption. There
cannot be an utility increasing effect of non-paid child care because other-
wise there would be no reason to use paid child care. Thus, the above setup
does not require that for each unit of labor supply one unit of paid child care
has to be bought since instead non-paid child care could be used. Without
this assumption the documented fact that not all working females use paid
child care, compare Table 2, could not be generated.
Hotz and Miller (1988) assume that mothers incur a time cost of having
children that declines geometrically with the age of the children to capture
that children of different ages have different needs. I make a similar as-
sumption and allow for the possibility that the utility mothers receive from
spending time with their children declines geometrically over time, i.e. as
the children get older. This increases both the incentive to use (more) paid
and non-paid child care and to participate (more) in the labor market as
the children get older. The speed of the reduction is given by the parameter
ξ1 > 0 whereas the lower bound, i.e. the utility in the last period when chil-
dren are of age 15.5 to 18.5, is governed by ξ2 ∈ [0, 1] through the following
linear transformation:
ξ(t) = ξ2 +
t−ξ1 − T−ξ1
1− T−ξ1
(1− ξ2) for t = 1, . . . , T and T = 6. (5)
With the focus being on pre-school child care, I assume that the costs of
non-paid child care usage only accrue while children are of pre-school age,
i.e.
φ(t) =
{
φ1 for t ≤ 2
0 else.
(6)
Put differently, a mother does not have to organize child care if she does
not spend time with her children after the end of the school day. Recall
that the utility costs of non-paid child care are required to be negative
in order to induce females to use paid child care. I assume that every
female can use as much non-paid child care as she desires and that the
associated utility costs are homogenous among females. This assumption
can be justified as follows. First, the husbands could always take care of the
children while the female is working. The only requirement, given that all
husbands are working full-time, is that the spouses are working at different
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times of the day. At least in principle this arrangement is open to all females,
although frictions in the real world labor market might limit the choice
of when to work. Second, Table B.1 in Appendix B presents evidence in
favor of homogenous costs. The children’s grandparents, i.e. the female’s or
husband’s parents, are (next to the husband) the most likely provider of non-
paid child care. The geographical distance towards grandparents is probably
one of the most important sources for heterogeneity in access to and thus the
cost of non-paid child care. Table B.1 shows that this heterogeneity does
hardly translate in any statistically significant differences of the maternal
labor force participation and child care enrollment rates. Although this is
not a proof for homogenous costs of non-paid child care, it is clearly not a
rejection of the assumption.
4.4 Budget Constraint
The per-period budget constraint is given by:
ct = τ [yt(lt, xt, ǫt), y
∗
t (t, ǫ
∗
t )]− fcc [n, t, ccs,t, ccns,t, yt, y
∗
t ] + Υ [n, t, lt] . (7)
The function τ calculates the after tax household income from the female’s
(yt) and husband’s (y
∗
t ) gross income. The latter depends on two compo-
nents: a deterministic component in time t, i.e. all husbands are assumed to
work full-time and thus accumulate full-time experience,15 and a stochas-
tic component represented by the husband’s current period income shock
(ǫ∗t ). In contrast, the female’s income depends on her labor supply (lt),
accumulated experience (xt) through past labor force participation
xt = xt−1 + lt−1, with x1 = 0 (8)
and her current period income shock (ǫt). Similar to the vast majority of
structural models investigating labor supply and fertility choices of married
females, see e.g. Hotz and Miller (1988), Francesconi (2002) or Haan and
Wrohlich (2009), I abstract from savings. Child care fees fcc depend on the
number (n) and age (t) of the children, the utilized amount of subsidized
(ccs,t) and non-subsidized (ccns,t) child care as well as the gross household
income. In addition, households receive transfers Υ conditional on the time
period/age of the children (t) and choices (n, lt). The functional forms for
the gross incomes y and y∗, the tax schedule τ , the child care fees fcc and
transfers Υ are specified further below in Section 5.1.
15In the data, 95% of all husbands in the selected sample work full-time.
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4.5 Choice Variables
All choices are assumed to be discrete. Labor supply lt can take on three
values:
lt =


0 for non-working
1
4 for part-time work
1
2 for full-time work
∀ t = 1, . . . , 6. (9)
If the (non-sleeping) time endowment would be 16 hours, then part-time
labor force participation would correspond to four and full-time work to
eight hours. Similarly, subsidized ccs,t and non-subsidized child care ccns,t
can take on three values:
cci,t =


0 for no paid child care
1
4 for paid part-time child care
1
2 for paid full-time child care
∀ t = 1, 2 and i = s, ns. (10)
The actual choice of subsidized child care is however restricted by the access
at to a subsidized child care slot:
ccs,t ≤ at ∀ t = 1, 2, (11)
with
at =


0 no access to subsidized child care
1
4 access to subsidized part-time child care
1
2 access to subsidized full-time child care
∀ t = 1, 2. (12)
As already mentioned, access to a subsidized child care slot is determined
by a lottery with age- and type-dependent, i.e. part- or full-time, success
probabilities. Paid child care in subsidized and non-subsidized arrangements
is restricted to
ccs,t + ccns,t ≤
1
2
∀ t = 1, 2, (13)
i.e. child care facilities are only open during the first half of the day in
the morning and early afternoon. A mother can still spend time with her
children in the late afternoon and evening such that in principle
mt ∈
{
0,
1
4
,
1
2
,
3
4
, 1
}
. (14)
However, while she is working and/or the children are in paid child care or
later in life in mandatory costless schooling (st), she cannot spend any time
with her children:
mt ≤
{
1−max{lt, ccs,t + ccns,t} ∀ t ≤ 2
1−max{lt, st} ∀ 3 ≤ t ≤ 6.
(15)
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Figure 6: Life Cycle
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4.6 Dynamic Problem
Figure 6 presents the timing of events during a female’s life which is defined
by the stages of her children’s adolescence (compare also Figure 3). The
term zt combines the income shocks of both spouses (ǫt, ǫ
∗
t ) and the female’s
experience level (xt, with x1 = 0). The first period is split up in two stages
with different state and decision variables. In the first stage, the initial
income shocks are assigned and the female chooses the optimal number of
children (n) taking into account the uncertainty with respect to the access
to subsidized child care:
max
n
{Ea1V (1, ǫ1, ǫ
∗
1, x1, n, a1), n = 0, 1, 2, ..., N} , (16)
with V (·) being the female’s value function. Once the optimal number of
children (n) is chosen, n becomes a state variable as the children stay with
the mother throughout her entire life. After access to subsidized child care
is determined by the lottery, the female decides on her labor supply (l1)
and those with children, on how much time to spend with them (m1) and
on their enrollment in subsidized child care (ccs,1), possibly restricted by
a1, and non-subsidized child care (ccns,1). The following Bellman equation
represents the female’s problem in the second stage:
V (1, ǫ1, ǫ
∗
1, x1, n, a1) = max
m,l,ccs,ccns
u1 + βEǫ,ǫ∗,a2V (2, ǫ2, ǫ
∗
2, x2, n, a2)
subject to (7), (8), (11), (13) and (15).
(17)
u1 is the period-specific utility function (Equation (2)) and β is the discount
factor. At the beginning of period two, the new income shocks (ǫt, ǫ
∗
t ) realize
according to the AR(1) process specified in Equation (1) and access to child
care (a2) is drawn from a new lottery. The set of choice variables in period
17
two is identical to the second decision stage in period one and the value
function is given by
V (2, ǫ2, ǫ
∗
2, x2, n, a2) = max
m,l,ccs,ccns
u2 + βEǫ,ǫ∗V (3, ǫ3, ǫ
∗
3, x3, n, 0)
subject to (7), (8), (11), (13) and (15).
(18)
From period three onwards, children attend mandatory school and females
cannot use child care anymore (at = 0 for t ≥ 3). Hence, a female only
decides on how much to work and how much time to spend with her children:
V (t, ǫt, ǫ
∗
t , xt, n, 0) =max
m,l
ut + βEǫ,ǫ∗V (t+ 1, ǫt+1, ǫ
∗
t+1, xt+1, n, 0) ∀ 3 ≤ t ≤ 6
subject to (7), (8) and (15)
and V (7, . . . ) = 0.
(19)
4.7 Maternal Leave
An important element affecting labor force participation decisions of females
with children aged zero to two is the German maternal leave regulation. It
permits every mother who worked until the birth of a child to return to her
pre-birth employer at her pre-birth wage within three years after birth. Since
in the model life starts with the birth decision, there is no pre-birth labor
supply and I therefore grant all females the right to go on maternal leave.16
Relevant in this setup is the stochastic part of income. By construction,
part- and full-time working mothers work at their initial or pre-birth wage
income shock in period one. Hence, the maternal leave regulation has only
to be modeled explicitly for mothers that do not work in the first period,
i.e. for which l1 = 0 or equivalently x2 = 0. I assume that they draw a new
income shock at the beginning of the second period according to Equation
(1) (e.g. an offer for a new position) but can opt for the pre-birth income
shock (e.g. return to the pre-birth position) such that the offered wage in
the second period is given by y2 (l2, 0,max{ǫ1, ǫ2}). The third period income
shock is then determined by
ǫ3 =
{
ρ max{ǫ1, ǫ2}+ ε3 if l1 = 0, l2 > 0
ρǫ2 + ε3 else.
5 Calibration
In the following paragraphs, I specify the functional forms for the exogenous
model inputs which are, where applicable, either presented as monthly or
16In the sample investigated here, 94% of all mothers work prior to the first birth.
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annual values. When used in the model all variables are transformed to
correspond to the model period length of three years. All monetary values
are expressed in real terms in 2008e. In this section I further discuss the
target moments for the calibration exercise and the calibrated preference
parameters.
5.1 Functional Forms
5.1.1 Income
Husbands In line with the data, all husbands are assumed to work full-
time. I assume that the log of their gross income y∗t is a concave function of
time in the model or, respectively, of the youngest child’s age in the data:
ln y∗t = η
∗
0 + η
∗
1(t− 1) + η
∗
2(t− 1)
2 + ǫ∗t (20)
The gross full-time income yt(lt =
1
2 , xt, ǫt) of a female is given by a classical
Mincer (1974) earnings equation with returns to experience. As a normal-
ization xt is multiplied by two (x˜t = 2xt) such that part-time work increases
x˜ by 0.5 and full-time work by 1:
ln yt = η0 + η1x˜t + η2x˜
2
t + ǫt. (21)
I assume that there is no part-time penalty, i.e. the gross part-time income
is half of the gross full-time income for the same level of experience and the
same income shock.
Appendix C.1 describes how the income processes are estimated. The pre-
dicted income profiles are displayed in Figure 7. For the numerical solution
of the model, the AR(1) process for the income shock (Equation (1)) is
discretized into 20 states using the method proposed by Tauchen (1986).
5.1.2 Taxes and Transfers
The tax code implemented in the model incorporates the three key elements
of the German tax system: mandatory social security contributions, pro-
gressive and joint taxation.
Employees, excluding civil servants, have to make mandatory contributions
to the pension system, unemployment, long-term care and public health
insurance which accrue proportionally to income up to a contribution limit.
In the model I use the average contribution limits and rates for each type of
insurance over the years 1983 to 2006. Similarly, the implemented tax code is
based on the average income taxes over the sample period. The construction
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Figure 7: Income Profiles
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of the tax code is described in Appendix C.2 which also shows the final social
security contributions and tax rates used in the model. In Germany legally
married couples are taxed jointly, i.e. the tax code is applied to half of the
sum of the spouses’ incomes and the resulting tax burden is doubled. By
the progressivity of the tax system the joint net income is always at least
as large as the sum of the individually taxed incomes. Although my sample
includes some cohabitating but not legally married couples, I apply joint
taxation.
The transfers considered include the average child benefits over the the years
1983 through 2006 which are paid each period depending on the total num-
ber of children. The average benefit per child is slightly increasing in the
number children, see Table C.4 in Appendix C.2. Based on the description
in Ludsteck and Scho¨nberg (2007) non- and part-time working mothers re-
ceive in period one a maternity benefit of 2414.19 e which comprises the
maternity benefits in paid during the first six months after a child is born
if the mother does not work.
5.1.3 Child Care Fees
The child care fees fcc [n, t, ccs,t, ccns,t, yt, y
∗
t ] consist of two parts: the per-
child fees for subsidized and non-subsidized child care in multiplied by the
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Table 3: Fertility Distribution
Nr. of Children
0 1 2 3
Fraction 10.7 21.0 50.4 17.8
Note: Figures are based on the 1140 females
from the sample selected in Section 2 who have
completed their fertile period, assumed to end
at the age of forty.
number of children. The per-child fees for subsidized child care are the
predicted values from a Tobit-regression with censoring at 0e and at 447.72
e, the lowest and highest observed monthly fee for subsidized child care with
the following set of regressors: an intercept, a full-time dummy, a dummy
for ages zero to two, number of further siblings enrolled in subsidized child
care, and household income.17 The per-child fees for non-subsidized child
care are the predicted values from an OLS-regression on a constant and a
full-time dummy, the only two regressors that turned out to be statistically
significant. The coefficients for both regressions and predicted fees are shown
in Tables C.5 and C.6 in Appendix C.3.
5.1.4 Subsidized Child Care Provision Rates
The age- and type-dependent, i.e. part- and full-time, success probabilities
in the lottery determining access to subsidized child care are taken from
Figure 5 and are also shown in Table A.3 in Appendix A.3.
5.1.5 School Hours
I assume that children attend school part-time (st =
1
4) in periods three and
four, i.e. for ages seven to 12.5, and full-time (st =
1
2) in periods five and six,
i.e. for ages 13 to 18.5. Schooling hours matter by limiting the maximum
amount of time the mother can spend with her children, compare Equation
(15).
17The sibling discount and income dependence are part of the regulations for the sub-
sidized child care fees. I define household income as the average monthly income of both
spouses in the year the fee is observed deflated by the OECD equivalence scale given by
Equation (3) to account for different household sizes.
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5.2 Data Targets
The discount factor β is set to
(
1
1.04
)3
as in Kydland and Prescott (1982).
The remaining 12 preference parameters are calibrated by matching 12 mo-
ments that are grouped in three data categories. I assign each parameter
to the group where the influence is felt the heaviest. Since all parameters
jointly determine the model statistics, the following discussion is only sug-
gestive and informal.
Fertility While ζ reflects the fixed costs of having a positive number of
children, δ2 and γ2 govern the direct utility of having children. Accordingly
these three preference parameters strongly influence the fertility outcomes.
I target the fraction of females without, with one and with two children.
Table 3 shows the empirical fertility distribution for a maximum of three
children per female which are adjusted for the fact that around 3.5% of
all couples are unable to get children at all, see Robert Koch Institut and
German Statistical Office (2004).
Labor Force Participation Since the focus of the analysis is on child
care and thus the pre-school ages, I target the average (over all mothers)
part- and full-time labor force participation rate when children are of ages
zero to two and three to six and a half. In addition, both rates are targeted
in the last period considered, i.e. when children are of ages 15.5 to 18.5.
The six parameters governing the time allocation of the mother, i.e. leisure
(δ1 and γ1) and time spend with the children (δ3, γ3, ξ1 and ξ2) have the
tightest link to this data category. In particular, in period one neither ξ1
nor ξ2 have a direct impact on the utility of time spent with children since
ξ(1) = 1 ∀ ξ1, ξ2. The labor force participation decision in period six is as
well independent of ξ1 but strongly influenced by ξ2 which sets the utility
of time spent with children in the last period. ξ1 in turn determines how
fast the utility of time spent with the children decreases and the functional
form of Equation (5) implies the largest decrease to happen between period
one and two. Accordingly the value of ξ1 has a strong influence on the labor
force participation rate in period two.
Furthermore, I target the difference in the part-time labor force participation
rate between mothers with one and two children of age zero to two. This
statistic is affected by γ0 through the budget constraint where the effect of
labor force participation is interacted with the number of children via the
equivalence scale adjustment.
Child Care Enrollment I target the part- and full-time child care enroll-
ment rate of children aged three to six and a half (again as averages over
all mothers). The parameter φ1 gives the weight on the disutility of using
non-paid child care and φ2 governs how costly it is to increase the usage of
non-paid child care.
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Table 4: Targeted Data and Model moments
Target Data Model ∆Data-Model
Fertility
Fraction of females
without children 10.7 10.1 0.6
with one child 21.0 20.0 1.0
with two children 50.4 51.2 −0.8
Maternal Labor Force Participation Rate
Part-time
t = 1 26.5 26.5 0.0
t = 2 53.2 54.3 −1.1
t = 6 60.0 59.0 1.0
t = 1; ∆{n=1}−{n=2} 10.9 10.9 0.0
Full-time
t = 1 4.7 4.8 −0.1
t = 2 8.4 8.2 0.2
t = 6 19.7 19.5 0.2
Child Care Enrollment Rate
Part-time
t = 2 83.7 81.8 1.9
Full-time
t = 2 11.6 12.9 −1.3
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Table 5: Preference Parameters
Fertility
Number of children δ2= 1.12 γ2= 1.39
Fixed cost of children ζ= 0.59
Maternal Labor Force Participation
Consumption γ0= 1.98
Leisure δ1= 0.23 γ1= 2.33
Maternal time δ3= 2.23 γ3= 0.45 ξ1= 0.03 ξ2= 0.41
Child Care Enrollment
Non-paid child care φ1= 0.46 φ2= 2.45
Since no closed form solution of the corresponding model moments is avail-
able, I simulate 100,000 individuals. The initial income shocks are drawn
from the stationary distribution implied by the estimated parameters of
Equation (1). Despite the discrete nature of all choices, small changes
around the calibrated parameters induce small changes of the model statis-
tics because of the large heterogeneity. This is also true for the fertility out-
comes. Even the most likely initial combination of spousal income shocks
occurs only with a probability of 1.7%.18
5.3 Results
Table 4 shows the data moments along with the simulated model moments
for the calibrated model version. Table 5 lists the calibrated preference
parameters sorted by the calibration targets with a reference to the corre-
sponding parts in the utility function. Let me briefly comment on a few of
18I used for the calibration of the model parameters the asynchronous par-
allel pattern search algorithm described in Gray and Kolda (2006), and Kolda
(2005). The corresponding software (APPSPACK) is freely available on the web
(https://software.sandia.gov/appspack/version5.0/index.html) and was run in par-
allel mode on the Deutsche Bank/E-Finance Lab House of Finance Servercluster.
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the calibrated preference parameters. First, the curvature of consumption
is in the range of usually cited values. Second, the fixed cost ζ rescales the
utility from having children such that the direct utility from having the first
child (δ2, γ2) is 0.09 instead of 0.68. Third, the utility of maternal time
spent with the children decreases at a very modest speed as the children age
(ξ1 = 0.03) and is for children aged 15.5 to 18.5 (ξ2 = 0.41) less than half of
the utility for children aged zero to two.
6 Model Evaluation
To judge the model’s performance, I now turn to a set of overidentifying
restrictions. In particular, I focus on non-targeted moments that are at
the core of the analysis, namely child care enrollment for children aged
zero to two and the joint maternal labor force participation and child care
enrollment choices.19
6.1 Child Care Enrollment
In the model two mechanisms are at work that both generate a lower child
care enrollment rate for children aged zero to two compared to children aged
three to six and a half. First, the utility mothers receive from spending time
with their children declines as the children get older. This in turn increases
the incentive to use (more) paid and non-paid child care and to participate
(more) in the labor market when the children are of ages three to six and a
half compared to when the children are of ages zero to two. Second, the cost
of using paid child care relative to non-paid child care are higher for children
aged zero to two. While the usage of non-paid child care is assumed to be
associated with the same utility costs for both pre-school age groups, the
utility loss from the usage of paid child care through reduced consumption is
very different. Mothers with children aged zero to two who want to use paid
child care will mainly have to resort to non-subsidized child care because
of the low availability of subsidized child care. In addition, paid child care
is more expensive for children aged zero to two: in relative terms because
the household income (conditional on the maternal labor force participation
status) is on average lower; in absolute terms because subsidized child care
fees are on average associated with an extra charge of around 19e per
month, compare Table C.6 in Appendix C.3.
The question is now how well these two mechanisms are jointly able to
predict child care enrollment for children aged zero to two. E.g. it could be
19In Appendix D I discuss a set of non-targeted moments which were were only touched
on in the presentation of stylized facts in Section 3.
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Table 6: Non-Targeted Moments: Child Care Enrollment Rates
Ages 0 to 2 Ages 3 to 6.5
Data Model Data Model
Part-time 5.6 4.0 Target
[3.1 ; 8.2]
Full-time 0.6 0.5 Target
[0.0 ; 1.3]
Fraction Enrolled in 40.4 14.8 0.8 0.1
Non-Subs. Care [14.1 ; 66.7] [0.0 ; 2.0]
Note: 95% confidence intervals for the data moments are given in brackets.
that the higher costs of paid child care do not matter at all if for working
mothers without access to a subsidized slot, the costs of non-subsidized child
care are still below the costs of using non-paid child care. As an implication,
the predicted child care enrollment rates for children aged zero to two by
the model would be much higher than in the data. The upper panel of
Table 7 demonstrates that this is not the case. The two model mechanisms
described above predict the full-time child care enrollment rate precisely
(0.5% vs. 0.6%) and part-time enrollment falls only slightly short relative
to the data (4.0% vs. 5.6%). The latter difference mainly stems from a too
low usage of non-subsidized child care in the model compared to the data
(14.8% vs. 40.4%). Nevertheless, both rates in the model still fall in the
respective 95% confidence intervals and are qualitatively consistent with the
low part-time child care enrollment rate for children aged zero to two in the
data.
The model further predicts correctly that for children aged three to six and
a half non-subsidized child care is irrelevant. This result is basically implied
by the choice of calibration targets, i.e. by matching the part- and full-time
child care enrollment rates for this age group at the prevailing provision
rates of subsidized child care.
6.2 Conditional Child Care Enrollment
The lower panel of Table 7 shows that the child care enrollment rates con-
ditional on the maternal labor force participation status predicted by the
model are as well close to the data for both age groups. Very different out-
comes for the conditional child care enrollment rates would have also been
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Table 7: Non-Targeted Moments: Conditional Child Care Enrollment Rates
Ages 0 to 2 Ages 3 to 6.5
Data Model Data Model
At least part-time care
Not Working 2.9 2.7 93.2 92.1
[0.6 ; 5.1] [87.9 ; 98.7]
Working 13.7 11.6 96.7 96.4
[7.3 ; 20.5] [94.2 ; 99.1]
Full-time care
Full-time Working 3.9 2.7 32.4 28.8
[0.0 ; 11.2] [16.7 ; 47.6]
Note: 95% confidence intervals for the data moments are given in brackets.
consistent with matching and explaining the (unconditional) child care en-
rollment and maternal labor force participation rates. E.g. all and not only
28.8% of the full-time working females with children aged three to six and a
half (8.2 %, see Figure 4) could have been using full-time child care and the
full-time child care enrollment rate (12.9%, see Figure 4) could have been
generated by a lower usage of full-time child care of non- and part-time
working mothers.
The successful prediction of the conditional child care enrollment rates can-
not be explained by a single mechanism in the model but rather reflects that
the main trade-offs mothers face in real life are captured well by the model.
Just to give one example: the assignment of subsidized child care slots is
random and does not favor working women. This contributes to the relative
low full-time child care enrollment rates conditional on working full-time.
These outcomes are of course not independent from the costs of non-paid
child care (also relative to non-subsidized child care) and the selection into
full-time participation.
To sum up, with the focus of the paper being on the joint labor force partic-
ipation and child care enrollment choices of mothers, the good predictions
of the non-targeted child care moments provide confidence in the model’s
explanatory power.
27
7 Policy Experiments
In April 2008 the German Federal government, back then a coalition of
christian (CDU/CSU) and social democrats (SPD), passed a law on the
supply of subsidized childcare (Kinderfo¨rderungsgesetz [Kifo¨g]). I evaluate
the major parts of this law.
7.1 Setup of the Reforms
Reform 1: For all children younger than age three a subsidized child care
slot shall be provided from October 2010 onwards if both parents are work-
ing. (§24 I 2 and §24a III Sozialgesetzbuch 8)
The bill on the Kifo¨g was introduced with the following statement: “Many
parents do not realize their desired fertility level, because of the incompati-
bility of family and working life ... Therefore it is necessary to improve the
compatibility of family and working life. To achieve this, we need more high
quality child care for children younger than age three.” (German Federal
Parliament, 2008) By this article, the coalition expected to achieve a child
care enrollment rate of 35% of all children younger than age three, and thus
compliance with the target of 33% set by the European Commission at its
Barcelona meeting in 2002, and to close the gap to the “exemplary standards
in Western and Northern European countries, for which a relationship be-
tween child care enrollment, maternal employment and fertility is observed”,
see Sharma and Steiner (2008). The reform is straightforward to implement
in the context of the model by conditioning access to subsidized child care
(a1) on the labor force participation status (l1):
a1 ≥ l1. (22)
While full-time working females can always use subsidized part-time or full-
time child care, I maintain the assumption that non-working females rely
on the initially specified slot lottery to have access to subsidized child care.
Part-time working females are in between because they can always use sub-
sidized part-time child care but subsidized full-time child care only if they
are successful in the slot lottery.
Reform 2: From August 2013 onwards all children of age one and two are
entitled to a subsidized child care slot. (§24 II Sozialgesetzbuch 8)
This passage can be seen in the tradition of providing subsidized child care
as a means of affordable, high quality pre-school education also for children
aged one to two. This view is confirmed in a dossier of the Federal Ministry
of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (Sharma and Steiner,
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Table 8: Policy Regimes
Access Probability (in %) to ... Subsidized Child Care
No Part-time Full-time
Ages 0 to 2
Baseline 94.0 ∀ l 4.3 ∀ l 1.7 ∀ l
Reform 1
94.0 if l = 0
0.0 else
4.3 if l = 0
100.0 else
1.7 if l ≤ 14
100.0 else
Reform 2 0.0 ∀ l 100.0 ∀ l
1.7 if l ≤ 14
100.0 else
Note: l = 0/ 1
4
/ 1
2
corresponds to non-/part-/full-time working.
2008) accompanying the Kifo¨g in which among others the beneficial aspects
of the enrollment in high-quality child care for infantile education are pointed
out. Already in the 1990’s an entitlement to a subsidized child care slot was
introduced for children aged three to six and a half which referred to part-
time slots only.20 I therefore assume that the “new” entitlement also refers
to part-time subsidized child care. The actual law applies to all children of
age one and two whereas the model period comprises ages zero to two, i.e.
one year more. Given the variables definition employed in Section 2 and
Appendix A.3, access to a subsidized part-time child care slot for only two
years in the data still corresponds to access to a subsidized part-time child
care slot for the whole model period. Hence, Reform 2 will be implemented
such that all mothers of children aged zero to two have at least access to a
subsidized part-time child care slot for their children independent of their
labor force participation status. Non- and part-time working mothers might
still draw from the lottery a subsidized full-time child care slot with the
success probability from the baseline setup.
Table 8 compares the baseline setup with the previously described reforms.
The parental fees for subsidized and non-subsidized child care are kept at
the values of the baseline setup.
I evaluate the impact of the reforms in three steps. I first compare the out-
20Note that in the baseline setup the total provision rate of subsidized child care for
children aged three to six and a half is only 95.6% because of the lower provision rates in
the first half of the observation period (up to the mid 1990’s). Increasing the provision
rate of part-time subsidized child care from 71.5% to 75.9% for children aged three to six
and a half in the calibrated model such that for each child at least a part-time subsidized
child care slot is available has no qualitative impact on the results.
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come from the baseline setup with the two experiments holding the fertility
choice fixed, i.e. I ask: how would the females behave if they had have made
their fertility choice under the baseline setup but then faced a setup as de-
scribed by the respective reforms? This permits to disentangle the direct
effect on maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment from
the one induced through changes in the fertility choices. In the second step,
I discuss the impact of each reform on the fertility choices. Afterwards I
summarize the results for the female and maternal labor force participation
rates and the child care enrollment rates taking the changes in the fertility
outcomes into account.
7.2 Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment
with Fixed Fertility
Table 9 restates the maternal labor force participation and child care enroll-
ment rates from the baseline setup and the resulting change in percentage
points under each reform. The fertility choices are held constant at their
values from the baseline setup.
Ages 0 to 2 Under Reform 1, all working mothers with children aged
zero to two have access to subsidized child care according to the their labor
force participation status but may gain access to more subsidized child care
through the initial lottery. This policy increases the part- and full-time
maternal labor force participation rate by 3.2 and 1.7 percentage points.
Thus in total 5.9 percentage points or 15.7% more mothers are working. For
these mothers the lack of subsidized child care constituted a barrier to work.
Although the results are not fully comparable, the increase in maternal
labor force participation is very similar to difference-in-differences estimates
from a drastic increase of subsidized child care in the late 1990’s in the
Canadian province of Quebec. Baker et al. (2008) estimate for two-parent
families an increase of the maternal labor force participation rate of 7.7
percentage points or 14.5% and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) estimate for
all mothers an increase of up to 8.1 percentage points or 13%. The increase
in the child care enrollment rates induced by Reform 1 is with 27.3 and 6.3
percentage points much larger than for maternal labor force participation
because mothers that worked in the baseline setup without using paid child
care now substitute non-paid with subsidized child care. This documents a
large excess demand for subsidized child care among working mothers.
The difference between Reform 1 and Reform 2 for children aged zero
to two is that non-working females also have access to a subsidized part-
time child care slot. Under this setup an additional 26.4% (53.7-27.3) of the
mothers are starting to use subsidized part-time child care, while none of
the other variables changes. This means that under Reform 1 no mother
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Table 9: Policy Effects with Fixed Fertility
Participation Enrollment
Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time
Ages 0 to 2
Baseline 26.5 4.8 4.0 0.5
Reform 1 +3.2 +1.7 +27.3 +6.3
Reform 2 +3.2 +1.7 +53.7 +6.3
Ages 3 to 6.5
Baseline 54.3 8.2 81.8 12.9
Reform 1 −0.3 0.0 +0.2 −0.2
Reform 2 −0.3 0.0 +0.2 −0.2
Ages 7 to 18.5 (Avg.)
Baseline 61.4 11.5 − −
Reform 1 +0.1 0.0 − −
Reform 2 +0.1 0.0 − −
is working just to be able to use subsidized child care. As mentioned before,
the policy maker have set up Reform 2 to provide affordable, high quality
pre-school education also for children in this age group. This presumes that
child care has a beneficial aspect on the children’s human capital which is
however not captured by the child quality measure employed in this paper
and also out of the scope of the analysis. Nevertheless, from the perspective
of policy makers the higher enrollment rates can thus be judged as a success
of Reform 2. Of further interest might be which mothers and thus which
children are most affected by Reforms 1 and 2 as it is often argued that
high quality child care is particular beneficial for children from low income
families. While this latter hypothesis cannot be addressed, the model makes
predictions on the former question.
Figure 8 compares the maternal labor force participation rates (left panel)
and child care enrollment rates (right panel) under the baseline scenario and
Reforms 1 and 2 by potential income quintiles. These are constructed with
the period one, gross joint income of all couples with children assuming the
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Figure 8: Policy Effects with Fixed Fertility by Potential Income
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female would be working full-time. This measure has two advantages over
the actual gross joint income. First, otherwise the quintiles of the baseline
scenario would not be comparable to those of Reforms 1 and 2 because
of the change in the labor force participation choices. Second, one and two
earner couples with the same actual gross (or even net) income might have
very different incentives to use child child care because of the different female
labor force participation statuses.
Under Reform 1 the largest (percentage point) increase of the maternal
labor force participation rate occurs for mothers from the first and second
quintile. As all working mothers in this scenario use subsidized child care,
the increase and the level of the child care enrollment rate in the two lowest
potential income quintiles is as well the highest. This is in stark contrast
to Reform 2 where only households where the woman is not working from
the upper quintiles, mainly the fourth and the fifth, afford the additionally
available subsidized child care. Hence, while potential income poor families
benefit disproportional from Reform 1, only potential income rich house-
holds benefit from Reform 2.
A last interesting aspect regards the comparison of the baseline setup with
Reform 2. With the exception of the access to subsidized full-time child
care, Reform 2 introduces a setup for children aged zero to two comparable
to the baseline setup for children aged three to six. In this age group in the
baseline setup, but also under Reforms 1 and 2, only 63% of the mothers
are working but 95% are using subsidized child care. The implied gap of
32 percentage points is very similar to the gap of 29 percentage points for
children aged zero to two under Reform 2 , where 36% of the mothers
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are working but 65% are using child care. Put differently, with the same
access to subsidized part-time child care for both age groups, the fraction
of females not working but using paid child care is nearly the same for both
age groups under Reform 2.
Ages 3 to 6.5 The higher accumulated experience when the children were
of ages zero to two does not change the full-time maternal labor force partic-
ipation rate when the children are of ages three to six. The small decrease
of the part-time maternal labor force participation rate can be explained
by the maternal leave regulation. Compare two females, with exactly the
same realizations of their own and husband’s income shocks in periods one
and two. One lives under Reform 1 (or Reform 2) and works in the first
period whereas the other lives under the baseline setup but does not work
due to the lack of subsidized child care. Through the maternal leave the
baseline female may “return” to work at her pre-birth income shock (ǫ1) in
period two if the period two draw of the income shock (ǫ2) is worse. The
Reform 1 female can however only work for ǫ2. Compared to the baseline
setup, 0.3 percentage points of them draw such bad ǫ2’s that they are not
willing to work anymore.
Ages 7 to 18.5 The maternal labor force participation rates as averages
over the school years display only very small increase of 0.1 percentage
points in the maternal part-time labor force participation rate relative to
the baseline setup. The effects on the maternal labor force participation
rate from age three onwards are so small because almost all females affected
by the reforms would anyway participate in the labor market once their
children turn three.
To sum up, for the same fertility choices as in the baseline setup Reform
1 demonstrates that the lack of subsidized child care for children aged zero
to two constitutes a barrier to start working or to work more. The total
maternal labor force participation rate goes up by 15% or 5.9 percentage
points, comparable to the Quebec experience, and the full-time maternal
labor force participation rate even by 35% or 1.7 percentage points. Still,
the changes in the maternal labor force participation rates do hardly lead to
an increased labor supply later in life. Furthermore, according to Reform
2 a substantial excess demand for subsidized child care exists also among
non-working mothers of children aged zero to two. Finally, while potential
income poor families benefit disproportional from Reform 1, only potential
income rich households benefit from Reform 2.
7.3 Fertility
Table 10 restates the fraction of females with zero to three children as well
as the implied fertility rate in the baseline setup and presents the resulting
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Table 10: Policy Effect on Fertility
Fraction with n children Fertility
0 1 2 3 Rate
Baseline 10.1 20.0 51.2 18.7 1.78
Reform 1 −2.9 +2.1 0.0 +0.8 +0.05
Reform 2 −2.9 +2.1 0.0 +0.8 +0.05
changes through the reforms.
Under Reform 1 the fraction of females without children decreases by 2.9
percentage points, i.e. by nearly 30%. For the fraction of females with two
children only the net change is 0.0. In fact, 0.8 percentage points of the
females with one children switch to having two children and 0.8 percentages
of the females with two children switch to having three children. The total
increase in the fertility rate amounts to 0.05 children per female. In analogy
to the previously cited introductory statement of the Kifo¨g (German Federal
Parliament, 2008), Reform 1 allows more parents to have their first child or
more children by improving the compatibility between family and working
life through the provision of subsidized child care.
Under Reform 2 additionally non-working mothers of children aged zero
to two are granted access to subsidized child care. There is no further
reaction in the fertility distribution or fertility rate relative to Reform
1. Put differently, only those females who are constrained in their labor
force participation choice through the lack of subsidized child care are also
constrained in their fertility choice.
7.4 Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment
with Flexible Fertility
Table 11 summarizes the results fromReforms 1 and 2 with the endogenous
fertility choice. For a final judgement on the effectiveness of each reform I
present in addition to the outcomes for children aged zero to two the life-
cycle averages of the maternal and female labor force participation rates
(average over periods one to six/ages zero to 18.5).
As seen in Section 7.3 fertility choices do change. Table 11 demonstrates
that it is important to endogenize fertility despite the relative low changes
in the fertility rate. In comparison to a fixed fertility choice (see Table 9),
the part-time labor force participation rate of mothers with children aged
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Table 11: Policy Effects with Flexible Fertility
Mothers All Females
Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time
Participation
Ages 0 to 2
Baseline 26.5 4.8 23.8 14.4
Reforms 1 and 2 +5.0 +2.4 +5.4 −0.5
Life-cycle Averages
Baseline 54.4 9.8 49.3 18.5
Reforms 1 and 2 +0.9 +1.0 +2.3 −1.5
Enrollment Ages 0 to 2
Baseline 4.0 0.5
Reform 1 +29.1 +7.0 − −
Reform 2 +54.6 +7.0 − −
zero to two increases by 5.0 percentage points if fertility is flexible but only
by 3.2 percentage points if fertility is held fixed. The difference is smaller for
full-time maternal labor force participation (2.4 vs. 1.7 percentage points)
and most pronounced when considering the female labor force participation
rates. If fertility is held fixed, the part- and full-time female labor force
participation rates increase by 2.9 and 1.5 percentage points. The increase
in the former rate with flexible fertility is much larger (5.4 percentage points)
whereas the latter rate even decreases by 0.5 percentage points.
With flexible fertility also the labor force participation rates from age three
onwards change for two reasons. First, the sample of mothers is increased by
the previously childless females which have a higher tendency to participate
in the labor market. Second, to support the larger family more mothers are
working (more). The maternal part- and full-time labor force participation
rates increase on average by 0.9 and 1.0 percentage points over the life-cylce.
The total female labor force participation rate increases as well but only
because the increase in the part-time female labor force participation rate
is larger than the decrease in the full-time female labor force participation
rate. The latter rate decreases because in the baseline setup essentially all
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childless females work full-time, but those who get their first child under
Reform 1 switch to part-time labor force participation.
7.5 Summary
Reform 1 achieves both goals it was set out to. Through the provision of
subsidized child care conditional on the maternal labor force participation
status not only barriers for the labor force participation of mothers with
children aged zero to two but also for the fertility choices are removed. The
fertility rate increases by 0.05 children per female and even over the whole life
cycle the female labor force participation rate increases on average along the
extensive margin. Furthermore, the German government expected to achieve
a child care enrollment for children aged zero to two of 35%. The resulting
child care enrollment rate is with 40.6% not that much above the expected
level. Given the higher maternal labor force participation rates, households
with a low potential income benefit disproportional from Reform 1.
Under Reform 2 which will become effective three years after Reform 1
additional 25.5 percentage points of the children will be enrolled in child
care. This was the intention of the reform. There is however no additional
effect on the fertility rate as only females constrained in their labor force
participation choice are constrained in their fertility choice through the lack
of subsidized child care. In contrast to Reform 1, only the potential income
rich households with non-working mothers take advantage of the additional
subsidized child care slots provided by Reform 2.
A final interesting question concerns the government budget effects of the
two reforms. Obviously, given the pure life-cycle setup I am not able to
account for any general equilibrium effects, e.g. the effect of the increased
labor supply on equilibrium wages or of a higher fertility rate on the social
security system in the future. Nevertheless, it is relatively simple to calculate
the net effects at the given tax rates and costs of subsidizing a particular
child care slot. For the latter concrete numbers are not available. According
to Kolvenbach et al. (2004) the subsidies cover on average around 75% of the
operating expenses per subsidized child care slot. I therefore assume that the
costs for each type of subsidized child care slot (distinguished by age group
and part- or full-time) correspond to four times the average reported fee in
the GSOEP for the specific category less the actual fees paid. For children
aged zero to two, the additional tax revenues generated by the changes in the
female labor force participation rate exceed the additional subsidies under
Reform 1 by 1.67% and nearly offset those under Reform 2 (-0.04%).
Accounting also for the change in female labor force participation later in
life, the discounted revenues less the subsidies are still positive forReform 1
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(0.12%) but become more negative for Reform 2 (-0.18%).21 Furthermore,
the discounted social security contributions underReforms 1 and 2 increase
by 0.24%. While these numbers certainly have to be taken with caution, e.g.
any fixed costs of offering more subsidized child care slots are ignored, they
suggest that the effects on the government budget are small.
8 Conclusion
At its Barcelona meeting in March 2002, the European Council recom-
mended its member states to improve the provision of child care and even set
explicit target levels. The intention of the initiative was to remove barriers
for female labor force participation and possibly foster fertility. This paper
asks within the context of a life-cycle model how important the provision of
child care is quantitatively for female labor force participation and fertility.
In line with the facts of a cross-section of OECD countries, I document for
a sample of married females in West Germany that the maternal labor force
participation rate is substantially larger than the child care enrollment rate
for children aged zero to two whereas the opposite is the case for children
aged three to six and a half. Put differently, the correlation between the
maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment rates is weak
whereas the correlation of both variables, particularly the child care enroll-
ment rate, with the childrens’ age is large. The child care enrollment rates
however match up perfectly with the provision rate of subsidized child care.
Historical experience and empirical evidence for Germany suggest that the
supply of subsidized child care is fixed in the short run despite an excess
demand for it. The major contribution of this paper is to investigate in how
far this fixed supply of subsidized child care at the given prices for rationed
subsidized and non-rationed non-subsidized child care affects the maternal
labor force participation, child care enrollment and fertility choices. I en-
dogenize these choices within a quantitative, dynamic life-cycle model and
distinguish between maternal time, paid child care provided in public (sub-
sidized) and market (non-subsidized) arrangements as well as non-paid child
care (e.g. by grandparents) to account for the age-dependent relationships
between maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment as ob-
served in the data.
I use a calibrated version of the model to evaluate two policy reforms passed
by the former German governing coalition in 2008 with the first becoming
effective in 2010 and the second in 2013. In particular, the first reform aims
at implementing the targets for child care provision set by the European
Council. The results of the two experiments can be summarized as follows.
21I use the same discount factor as in the optimization problem, i.e.
(
1
1.04
)3
.
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Increasing the provision of subsidized child care increases the maternal and
female labor force participation rate while children are of ages zero to two
and on average over the whole life-cycle. At the current provision levels of
subsidized child care for children aged zero to two there is also a substantial
excess demand for subsidized child care by non-working females. However,
only females that are constrained in their labor force participation choice by
the lack of subsidized child care are also constrained in their fertility choice.
At least qualitatively, the two reforms achieve their goals. Interestingly, at
least with respect to the operating expenses Reform 1 is self-financing and
even the net costs of Reform 2 are very low. Moreover, it is worth to
mention that potential income poor families benefit disproportionally from
Reform 1 whereas only the potential income rich households benefit from
Reform 2. Finally, it has to be kept in mind that the results only apply to
a selected sample of females, namely those in stable long-term relationships,
and not necessarily to the whole population of females.
Since the low maternal labor force participation, child care enrollment and
fertility rates in Germany are representative for Continental Europe the
derived policy implications should be of interest for other Continental Euro-
pean countries. The results of the evaluated reforms suggest that increasing
the provision of child care may not be sufficient for Continental Europe to
catch up to with the high maternal labor force participation and fertility
rates in Western and Northern Europe.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Sample Selection
Table A.1: Sample Selection Criteria
Frequency
Criterion Absolute Relative
West German†, born 1955-1975 4921 100.0%
No move to East German territory 4881 99.2%
Mothers 2868 58.8%
Childless 2013 41.2%
Mothers 2868 100.0%
Births only in relationships 2276 79.4%
Births only in one relationship 2238 78.0%
Relationship intact at last interview 1938 67.6%
Childless 2013 100.0%
At least age forty at last interview 424 21.1%
and in a relationship at age forty
Relationship intact at last interview 177 8.8%
Source: GSOEP 1984-2007.
† Females are assigned to West Germany by their location in 1989 or,
if this information is not available, by the sample region at their first
interview.
The focus of this paper is on labor force participation choices by mothers
rather than childless females. In addition, I do not investigate the timing
and spacing of births but only completed fertility choices. Hence, childless
females are only used for the fertility analysis and therefore only included
if they are at their last interview at least of age forty, the assumed age of
the end of a woman’s fertile period, and if their current relationship started
prior to age forty such that they at least theoretically could have had given
birth to a child during that marital spell.
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A.2 GSOEP Child Care Questions
Child Care Enrollment Imputation Information on the child care en-
rollment status for each child is only available at the interview date and is
therefore imputed for the other months of the year based on the following
reasoning: Since school starts at the same time for all children (at least
within one state), the oldest cohort in a daycare center leaves the daycare
center together at the same time of the year, i.e. usually at the end of the
first half of the year. Therefore the majority of entries into daycare centers
occurs at the beginning of the second half of the year. Hence, the child care
enrollment status in the first half (January to June) of a year is a good pre-
dictor for the status in the second half (July to December) of the previous
year. Similarly, the child care enrollment status in the second half of a year
is a good predictor for the child care enrollment status in first half of the
next year. If the interview month is in the first half of the year, which is the
case for more than 90% of the interviews, I use this child care enrollment
status also for the second half of the previous year if no interview has been
conducted in the second half of the previous year. Analogously, if the inter-
view month is in the second half of the year I use this child care enrollment
status also for the first half of the next year if no interview is conducted in
the first half of the next year. Although this reasoning applies more to child
care provided in daycare centers, I use the same imputation rule for child
care provided by nannies.
Aggregate Statistics Prior to 1995, the GSOEP questionnaire only cov-
ered enrollment in child care whereas from 1995 onwards a distinction be-
tween daycare centers and nannies was made. In particular, between 1995
and 1999 the distinction between daycare centers and nannies was exclusive
and from 2000 onwards non-exclusive. Furthermore, for care provided by
nannies from 2004 onwards part- and full-time can not be distinguished any-
more. I therefore only calculate the following two variables. Child care en-
rollment comprising subsidized (daycare centers) and non-subsidized (nan-
nies) child care for all years which can be part- or full-time, and from the
year 1995 onwards the fraction of children enrolled in non-subsidized child
care (nannies) from all children enrolled in child care (daycare centers and/or
nannies). This latter variable assumes that the relative usage of care pro-
vided by nannies prior to 1995 was the same as the average of the years 1995
to 2007. This strategy is only feasible because for the calibration exercise
only aggregate moments are used but no individual observations.
A.3 Subsidized Child Care Slot Provision
The slot provision rates are calculated from the data provided by the German
Statistical Office (Statistik der Jugendhilfe, various years). They are only
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available for every fourth year between 1986 and 2002. Table A.3 shows the
annual averages over the years 1983 to 2006, for which the monthly labor
supply status from the GSOEP is used. These averages are constructed
for the two age groups zero to two, and three to six and a half as follows:
Years before the earliest observation of the slot provision rates, i.e. 1983
to 1985, will be assigned the same value as the first observation of the slot
provision rate (1986). Similarly, years after the last observation, i.e. 2003
to 2006, will be assigned the same value as the last observation (2002).
For the years between two observations the mean of the corresponding two
observations will be used. The overall provision rates are then obtained
as the mean over all years. From 1994 onwards the provision rates can
be further distinguished by part- and full-time from which the fraction of
full-time slots from all slots, the full-time share, will be calculated. As
for the overall provision rate, the full-time share before the first and after
the last observed data points are extrapolated and between two observation
interpolated. The annual provision rate of part- and full-time slots is then
given by the provision rate of slots times the fraction of part- or full-time
slots from all slots. The mean over all these years then finally gives the
average provision rate of part- and full-time slots.
These latter rates are used to construct the success probabilities for the slot
lottery. If a female would have only one draw from the slot lottery at age
zero and age three, the provision rates could be immediately used as model
input. There is however no way to determine how often mothers apply for
a slot within a period which is regarded as a unified entity in the model. I
therefore transform the observed provision rates into period equivalents in
the following way: As already described for the imputation of the child care
status, the majority of entries into daycare centers happens once a year.
In addition, new information on the child care enrollment status is usually
only once a year available. I assume that in each year a female can draw
once from the lottery and a successful draw implies that the slot is open
for the remainder of the period, i.e. until age three is reached or the child
enters school. Once a full-time slot is drawn, the female does not have to
redraw until the end of the period. Drawing a part-time slot implies that
the female can redraw but success is then defined only as drawing a full-
time slot because she already has access to a part-time slot for the rest of
the period. Since a model period corresponds to three years I assume that
within a period there is a maximum of three draws which leads to the set
of possible access histories displayed in the left panel of Table A.2.
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Table A.2: Access to Subsidized Child Care
Access in Year Period Access History
1 2 3 Mean Status Probability
No No No 0 No (1− PP − PF )
3
No No Part 1/6 No (1− PP − PF )
2PP
No No Full 1/3 Part (1− PP − PF )
2PF
No Part Part 1/3 Part (1− PP − PF )PP (1− PF )
No Part Full 1/2 Part (1− PP − PF )PPPF
No Full Full 2/3 Part (1− PP − PF )PF
Part Part Part 1/2 Part PP (1− PF )
2
Part Part Full 2/3 Part PP (1− PF )PF
Part Full Full 5/6 Full PPPF
Full Full Full 1 Full PF
Consider the case that a female would always use as much subsidized child
care as she can get access to. In line with the definition for period child care
enrollment status in each year no slot is assigned a 0, part- and full-time
slots 0.5 and 1. The mean over the whole period - the three years - is given
in column 4 in Table A.2 whereas column 5 corresponds to the associated
child care enrollment status for each possible access history using the same
thresholds as before (0.25 and 0.75). Since I assume that a female does not
have to use the slot she has drawn access to for some part of the period
or at all, columns 4 and 5 give the period access status as opposed to the
period enrollment status. Column 6 displays the probability of observing a
specific access history. PP and PF are the probabilities of drawing a part- or
full-time slot in a given year and correspond to the observed slot provision
rates which differ by age. Finally, the probability for having access to no, a
part- or full-time slot over the whole period, which then corresponds to the
period provision rate, is equal to the sum of the history probabilities that
are associated with the respective period access status. For example, the
probability to have no slot as defined by the period access status would be
the sum over the two first histories ([No, No, No], [No, No, Part-time])
and equal to (1− PP − PF )
3 + (1− PP − PF )
2PP .
Table A.3 presents the annual, i.e. observed, slot provision rates and the
period provision rates after the transformation. E.g. while there are 62.5
part-time and 14.9 full-time slots per 100 children aged three to six and
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Table A.3: Annual and Period Provision Rates
of Subsidized Child Care Slots
Ages 0 to 2 Ages 3 to 6.5
Annual Period Annual Period
Part-time 0.5 4.3 62.5 71.5
⇒ ⇒
Full-time 1.7 1.7 14.9 24.2
a half, the probability for a female that she has access to a part-time slot
over the whole period where the child is between age three and six and a
half is 71.5% and 24.2% for a full-time slot. Note that by construction, the
period provision rates have to be larger than the annual/observed provision
rates. This is also the case for children aged zero to two for the non-rounded
numbers.
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B Model Appendix
Table B.1 shows in column one the fraction of females living within a cer-
tain distance to the children’s grandparents, i.e. the female’s or husband’s
parents. Columns two and three display the corresponding maternal labor
force participation and child care enrollment rates for each category. This
information is only available in the years 1991, 1996 and 2001 and has been
matched with the corresponding period labor force participation and child
care enrollment status. The last category (“Farther away”) also includes
females without any own parent or parent in law.
Table B.1: Minimum Distance to the Children’s Grandparents
Fraction Participation Enrollment
Ages 0 to 2
Same house 13.1 32.4 1.8
[10.9 ; 15.4] [23.7 ; 41.2] [0.0 ; 4.3]
Same neigbourhood 19.8 38.9 7.8
[17.1 ; 22.4] [31.5 ; 46.3] [3.7 ; 11.9]
Same city 21.8 29.3 6.5
[19.0 ; 24.6] [22.8 ; 35.9] [2.9 ; 10.1]
Within 1h driving distance 25.1 30.7 5.2
[22.2 ; 28.0] [24.4 ; 36.9] [2.2 ; 8.2]
Farther away 20.2 29.2 5.8
[17.5 ; 22.9] [22.4 ; 36.1] [2.3 ; 9.4]
Ages 3 to 6.5
Same house 11.7 63.0 89.1
[9.5 ; 14.0] [53.1 ; 73.0] [82.7 ; 95.5]
Same neigbourhood 19.5 66.0 90.8
[16.7 ; 22.2] [58.5 ; 73.5] [86.3 ; 95.4]
Same city 21.2 58.1 87.4
[18.4 ; 24.1] [50.6 ; 65.6] [82.4 ; 92.5]
Within 1h driving distance 24.0 61.9 81.5
[21.1 ; 27.0] [55.0 ; 68.8] [75.9 ; 87.0]
Farther away 23.5 51.9 77.8
[20.6 ; 26.5] [44.7 ; 59.1] [71.8 ; 83.8]
Note: 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets. The information on distance to
the (children’s) grandparents is only available in the years 1991, 1996 and 2001.
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C Calibration Appendix
C.1 Income
The husband’s income process (Equation (20)) as well as the persistence
parameter ρ∗ of the income shock ǫ∗t (Equation (1)) are estimated directly
from the data. I first calculate for each year the total annual labor income,
including side jobs and self-employment, pensions, unemployment benefits
(to capture the full risk of the income process), compensation for further
training or education, and any additional payments as boni, 13th and 14th
salary, vacation and Christmas pay received during the year. I then assign
to each month in a year the corresponding monthly average of the corre-
sponding annual income. Finally, the period income is defined as the sum
of these average monthly incomes over all months in a period.
While for the husbands the earnings equations (20) and (1) can be estimated
directly, this is more difficult for females since a consistent mapping between
the measure of experience in the model and experience in the data is only
feasible for females observed prior to their first birth. I therefore assume
that females face the same earnings process as their husbands but take into
account that they are on average 2.9 years younger and introduce a gender
gap in mean wages to capture gender differences in education, occupations
and potentially discrimination.
The age difference of nearly three years corresponds approximately to one
model period. A female who has worked full-time in all periods, i.e. x˜t =
t−1, should receive the same (deterministic) wage a male had in the period
before because of the age difference. I therefore shift the income process for
husbands by one period to obtain that of females:
ln Yt(x˜t = t− 1) = ln Y
∗
t−1 = η
∗
0 + η
∗
1(t− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜t
− 1) + η∗2(t− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜t
− 1)2 + ǫt
(C.1)
Equation (C.1) can then be reformulated to obtain the coefficients of the
female income process:
ln Yt =η
∗
0 − η
∗
1 + η
∗
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
η0
+ [η∗1 − 2η
∗
2 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
η1
x˜t + η
∗
2︸︷︷︸
η2
x˜2t + ǫt (C.2)
This implies that in the model in a given period, where husbands and females
by construction have the same age, females have a lower mean wage and face
larger returns to experience than their spouses if η∗2 < 0. Using the full-time
log wages of both sexes prior to the first birth,22 the gender wage gap in
22By then 75% of the females are working full-time.
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mean income controlling for age can be estimated and added to the log of
the gross income:
η0 = η
∗
0 − η
∗
1 + η
∗
2 +∆gender. (C.3)
The last missing piece of the income process concerns the stochastic part
(Equation (1)) where I follow Attanasio et al. (2008) and use the male esti-
mates for the females. Table C.1 summarizes the estimation results on the
income process.
Table C.1: Income Process
Estimate
Gender wage gap
∆gender -0.245
Deterministic part
η∗0 / η0 11.647 / 11.343
η∗1 / η1 0.051 / 0.065
η∗2 / η2 -0.007 / -0.007
Stochastic part
ρ∗, ρ 0.882
σε∗, σε 0.272
Note: Estimation based on incomes in 2008e. η0
is calculated as in Equation (C.3) and η1, η2 as in
Equation (C.2).
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C.2 Taxation and Transfers
The tax code is based on the average income taxes over the sample period in
2008 e, which are available (in nominal terms) for each
year on the website of the German Federal Ministry of Finance
(https://www.abgabenrechner.de/). The tax code consists of three parts
separated by two thresholds. First, annual incomes up to 3282e, the smallest
income tax allowance in the years 1983 to 2006, are tax-exempted. Second,
every e above 100,000e is taxed linearly at a marginal rate of 52%. Third,
every e between the two thresholds is taxed at an increasing marginal rate.
The coefficients for this part are obtained by regressing the average tax
burden over the sample period on a seventh order polynomial of taxable in-
come, i.e. income less the tax allowance. The upper threshold of 100,000e
was chosen because for higher incomes the average marginal taxes does not
change anymore. Figure C.1 and Table C.3 summarize the information on
the progressivity of the tax code implemented in this paper.
Table C.2: Monthly Social Security Contributions
Insurance Contribution
Type Rate (%) Limit (e)
Unemployment 3.52 4827.56
Pensions 10.29 4827.56
Health 7.28 3553.62
Long Term Care 0.40 3553.62
Source: German Federal Ministry of Labor and So-
cial Affairs. Figures are averages over the years 1983
to 2006 expressed in 2008 e and represent the em-
ployee’s contributions.
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Figure C.1: Annual Tax Burden and Average Tax Rate
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Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance, own calculations. Figures are averages over
the years 1983 to 2006 expressed in 2008 e.
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Table C.3: Annual Taxes
Taxable Income Tax Burden
0 - 3282 0
3283 - 100000
∑7
i=1 βi(y − 3282)
i
β1=.07415027
β2=.00001249
β3=-3.990e-10
β4=9.011e-15
β5=-1.143e-19
β6=7.456e-25
β7=-1.964e-30
100001 - ∞
∑7
i=1 βi(1e5− 3282)
i+(y-1e5)×0.52
Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance, own calculations. Fig-
ures are averages over the years 1983 to 2006 expressed in 2008 e.
Table C.4: Child Benefits
Number of Children Benefits
1 93.99
2 210.23
3 379.78
Source: German Federal Ministry of Fi-
nance. Figures are averages over the years
1983 to 2006 expressed in 2008 e.
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C.3 Child Care Fees
Table C.5: Monthly Per Child Fees - Regression Coefficients
Subs. Non-Subs.
Intercept 53.79 236.49
Full-time 50.20 177.52
Ages 0 to 2 21.90 —
Siblings in −29.56 —
subsidized child care
Household income† 0.02 —
Note: The coefficients for subsidized child care are ob-
tained from a Tobit regression from all children in the
selected sample enrolled in subsidized child care with cen-
soring at 0e and at 447.72 e, the lowest and highest ob-
served monthly fee for subsidized child care. Due to the
low usage of non-subsidized child care the coefficients for
non-subsidized care are obtained from all children in the
GSOEP in non-subsidized child care by an OLS regression.
The information about fees that also allows to distinguish
between subsidized and non-subsidized child care is only
available in the years 1996, 2002 and 2005 and were trans-
formed into 2008e.
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Table C.6: Monthly Per Child Fees - Predicted Values
Subs. Non-Subs.
Baseline fee
Part-time 63 236
Ages 3 to 6.5
No siblings
Median household income†
Extra Charges
Full-time (+) 46 177
Ages 0 to 2 (+) 19 —
Siblings in subsidized child care
One further (–) 27 —
Two further (–) 45 —
Household income is (+) 30 —
twice the median
Note: The fees are expressed in 2008e and are predicted
values from the regressions reported in Table C.5.
† The median household income in the sample with chil-
dren in subsidized child care amounts to 4583e per month
and is further deflated by the OECD (Oxford) equivalence
scale to account for household size. A two parent, one child
household is assumed for the baseline fees and in case of
the sibling discount two and three children are used for the
application of the equivalence scale.
Non-subsidized child care is estimated to be three to four
times as expensive as subsidized child care.This estimate
seems very plausible as around 75% of the operating ex-
penses per subsidized child care slot are covered by the
subsidy, see Kolvenbach et al. (2004).
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D Model Evaluation Appendix
In this section I discuss a set of non-targeted moments which were were only
touched on in the presentation of stylized facts in Section 3.
The left panel of Figure D.1 shows that the part-time maternal labor force
participation rate is predicted very well also for the non-targeted periods
three to five. In contrast, the full-time maternal labor force participation
rate in the data increases during periods three to four but decreases slightly
in the model. This can be explained by the dominance of the participation-
decreasing effect of the increasing husbands’ income (see Figure 7) over the
participation-increasing effect of the decreasing utility from spending time
with the children. In the fifth period the latter effect dominates the former
such that the full-time maternal labor force participation rate in the model
increases and is very close to the data.
Figure D.1: Model Fit - Part- vs. Full-time Rates
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Recall that the average part- and full-time maternal labor force participation
rate in periods one, two and six were used as targets. Figure D.2 documents
the part- and full-time maternal labor force participation rates broken down
by the number of children. The just described behavior of the full-time la-
bor force participation rates during periods three to five is common to all
parities. For females with one child part-time labor force participation is too
high relative to the data, particularly once children enter school, whereas
the opposite is true for the full-time labor force participation rate. For fe-
males with two children, which represent more than half of all females and
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Figure D.2: Model Fit - Part- vs. Full-time Rates by the Number of Children
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all mothers in the sample, both labor force participation rates are predicted
fairly well and fall within the 95% confidence intervals. For females with
three children both rates in the model are lower than the actual ones with
the exception of the full-time labor force participation rate in the first two
periods. The part- and full-time child care enrollment rates by the number
of children are matched precisely. Although for mothers with one child the
part-time child care enrollment rates are not within the 95% confidence in-
tervals, the qualitative facts, i.e. a low (high) part-time child care enrollment
rate for children aged zero to two (three to six and a half), are predicted
correctly by the model.
The overprediction of part-time labor force participation of mothers with
one child and the underprediction of labor force participation of mothers
with three children is linked to the fertility choice. Differences in fertility
outcomes stem from the heterogeneity of the initial productivity/income
shocks of both spouses, see Figure D.3. Note that the probability of observ-
ing a certain combination of initial income shocks is not equally distributed
but concentrated (symmetrically) around the center of the graph. Gener-
ally, fertility is increasing in the initial income shock of one spouse holding
fixed the other spouse’s initial income shock.23 Jones et al. (Forthcoming)
discuss the fertility-income relationship for various models. Similar to the
result presented here, they show that in a static model with child care as
a substitute for maternal time, fertility is increasing in household income.
This relationship is responsible for the differences in the labor force partic-
ipation rates between the model and data for females with one and three
children. The former are on average (due to the persistence of the shock)
of lower productivity types and therefore rather work part- than full-time.
This force is stronger than the relatively low incomes of their husbands which
in principle would provide an incentive for more females with one child to
work full-time. The combination of low productivity females and husbands
also explains the low part-time child care enrollment rate in the model rel-
ative to the data. Some of these females prefer to incur the utility loss
of using non-paid child care over the consumption loss of using paid child
care. In contrast, females with three children have a lower incentive to work
part- and full-time because their husbands have a higher initial productivity
(which is persistent over time) and thus a higher income on average, see
Figure D.3. Only in the first two periods, where the husbands’ incomes are
relatively low (compared to later in life), more females with three children
are working full-time in the model relatively to the data because they are
23Three exceptions break this monotonicity. In contrast to their “neighbors”, couples
with the lowest initial productivity shock combination choose three children because their
income is that low that the income gain through the child benefits outweighs the decrease
in the female’s consumption share through the presence of the children. The two other
exceptions stem from the interaction of the non-linear child care fees and benefits with
the child-dependent equivalence scale in the budget constraint.
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Figure D.3: Fertility and Income in the Model
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themselves of a high productivity type.
Given the structure of the model employed in this paper, a direct comparison
between the fertility-income relationship in the data and the model is not
possible. As an approximation Table D.1 shows the coefficients from an OLS
regression of the total number of children on an intercept and education
dummies for the female and the husband. In the data, high education is
defined as having at least a vocational degree plus the permission to attend
college (Fachhochschule/Universita¨t) or a college degree. In the model, high
education is defined as having an above mean initial income shock and in
the regression each spousal productivity combination is weighted according
to the stationary distribution. The intercept in the model regression of
0.95 reflects the large fraction of low educated couples with zero children,
compare Figure D.3.24 In the data, low income couples have on average
much more children which is reflected by the higher intercept (1.63). While
the size of the education effects is not matched, the model replicates that
the husband’s education is a stronger predictor for fertility than the female’s
education by a similar magnitude in absolute terms (0.200.12 = 1.7 vs.
1.07
0.59 =
1.8). However, in the model also the female’s education raises the number
of children while there is no statistically significant effect in the data.
24Note that the couples with the lowest initial productivity shock combination (who
have three children) only enter with a weight of 0.000015%.
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Table D.1: Fertility and Income in the Data and the Model
Data Model
Intercept 1.63∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
High Educated Female −0.12 0.59∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06)
High Educated Husband 0.20∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06)
Note: Standard errors are give in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indi-
cate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. In the regression for
the model the stationary distribution was used for weighting.
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